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Human Rights Bulletin June 15-21 2026

Human Rights Bulletin June 15-21 2026
By OIAC Blog July 5, 2026
Weekly Report on Human Rights Violation in Iran
June 15-21, 2026
International Condemnation of Violation of Human Rights in Iran

This document reports extensive human rights violations in Iran, including thousands of civilian casualties from military conflict, widespread executions, suppression of dissent, economic hardship, and systemic repression facilitated by ideological education and legal restrictions, with calls from UN experts and human rights groups for accountability, protection of rights, and international attention to these abuses.

Iran peace deal must not come at the cost of human rights, warn UN experts
19 June 2026
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/06/iran-peace-deal-must-not-come-cost-human-rights-warn-un-experts

GENEVA – UN experts* today welcomed the signing of a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran but warned that any agreement that fails to address the human rights situation in Iran will be fundamentally incomplete.

“The Memorandum focuses almost entirely on military withdrawal, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, nuclear commitments, sanctions relief and a $300 billion reconstruction fund . The Iranian people — who have suffered enormously from both external military aggression and internal repression – are barely visible in this framework,” the experts said.

The war has exacted a devastating toll in Iran and in the wider region. Thousands of civilians have been killed in airstrikes striking schools, hospitals, religious and cultural sites and residential areas, with millions internally displaced. The strikes have further worsened an already fragile humanitarian situation, including for the millions of Afghan refugees living in Iran. The conflict has also caused environmental damage to infrastructure, air, water sources, agricultural land as well as increased climate impacts.

“Since the war began in late February, Iranian authorities have moved aggressively against dissent. Thousands have been detained, with many reportedly tortured, forcibly disappeared, subjected to mock executions or forced to confess on camera. At least 156 individuals have been executed since the war began,” they said.

At least 42 individuals were executed on espionage and national security-related charges – many following proceedings in which confessions were reportedly obtained under torture and access to legal counsel denied. Authorities have also seized the assets of at least 1,500 citizens, including hundreds of Iranians living abroad, as a tool of punishment and transnational repression. Bahá’ís, Kurds and Baluch Iranians have been particularly at risk. A recent amnesty announced by the Supreme Leader explicitly excluded those convicted of security-related offences, meaning many protest detainees remain imprisoned.

“The human cost has been compounded by severe economic harm in Iran, as well as in the region and globally,” the experts said.

Three months of near-total internet shutdown – one of the longest ever recorded – severed businesses, livelihoods and families from the outside world. While connectivity has now largely returned, Iranians continue to face heavy filtering, hampering recovery in a country already pushed into deep economic precarity before the war began. Unemployment has increased drastically, monthly food inflation has reached 115%, and widespread delays in wage payments have left daily workers particularly exposed.

The experts hope that the $300 billion reconstruction fund envisaged under the Memorandum, once its implementation mechanism is finalised, will genuinely benefit the Iranian people enduring this economic hardship.

“A deal that serves geopolitical interests while leaving the Iranian people behind is not a peace agreement worthy of the name,” the experts warned. “The reopening the Strait of Hormuz merely restores what existed before this war began. The bar must be far higher than a return to the status quo. The voices of Iranians – millions of whom took to the streets demanding fundamental change – must be heard in any negotiation that claims to secure their future.”

The experts called on all States, including mediating States, to use their influence to ensure that any final deal – negotiated over the next 60 days – incorporates accountability, redress and reparations for victims, as well as concrete, verifiable commitments on a moratorium on executions, the release of arbitrarily detained persons, the disclosure of the fate and whereabouts of forcibly disappeared persons, restoration of open internet access, and the protection of civic space.

The experts cautioned that the end of hostilities must not be mistaken for the restoration of rights. “For the Iranian people, that work is yet to begin.”

*The experts:

Execution

The 125th week of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign in 56 prisons across Iran
June 16, 2026
https://iran-hrm.com/2026/06/16/the-125th-week-of-the-no-to-execution-tuesdays-campaign-in-56-prisons-across-iran/

In the 125th week of this protest movement, members of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign went on a hunger strike in 56 different prisons across the country to declare their decisive opposition to the inhumane punishment of execution. This protest action continues under circumstances where the judiciary has hanged more than 177 prisoners since the beginning of the Iranian year 1405 (March 21, 2026), and by repeatedly transferring political and protesting prisoners to solitary confinement cells in Ghezel Hesar Prison, has put the lives of more of them at immediate risk of execution. Pointing to recent warnings by Amnesty International, the hunger strikers and human rights activists demand public solidarity and serious international action to break the cycle of deprivation of life and to immediately halt these cruel sentences.

Please find the full text of the statement by the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign below:

Continuation of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign in its 125th week in 56 different prisons.

In the critical conditions of Iranian society, while the Velayat-e Faqih regime and its apparatus of suppression and judiciary have hanged more than 177 prisoners since the beginning of the Iranian year 1405 (March 21, 2026), we continue to witness the issuing and implementation of inhumane death sentences. This is a desperate attempt to contain the explosion of public anger of a people who are fed up with oppression, tyranny, and high prices.

According to news published last week, in addition to hundreds of common-crime prisoners who are sentenced to death in silence and a large number of whom have their sentences carried out, the death sentences of at least political prisoners Ali Fattah and Mohammad Naghizadeh have been confirmed by the Supreme Court, and they have been transferred to solitary confinement in Qezel Hesar Prison.

Two other political prisoners named Ali Kamali and Peyman Ganji have also been transferred from the Greater Tehran Prison to Qezel Hesar Prison. Peyman Ganji is a 23-year-old youth who was arrested in the January 2026 uprising and was sentenced to death by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

As we have pointed out many times before, Qezel Hesar Prison is the main center of executions in Tehran province and one of the government’s slaughterhouses, housing many of those sentenced to death; and prisoners sentenced to death are put at risk of execution after being transferred to this prison.

In response to the wave of executions of political prisoners and the danger to the lives of five prisoners (Alireza Mardasi, Masoud Jamei, Reza Abdali, Farshad Etemadifar, and Hassan Maslawi), Amnesty International has called for a halt to the executions of these five individuals and other prisoners in Iran.

We, the members of the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign, demand an immediate halt to executions and call on all awake consciences and political, human rights, civil, and labor activists, etc., to condemn executions in any way possible and to take serious action to stop them.

The realization of freedom, equality, and the preservation of human dignity is not possible without realizing the right to life of human beings. We issue a call for solidarity and united action to all opponents of execution to break the despotic structure and the cycle of depriving human life.

The “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign is on hunger strike on Tuesday, June 16, 2026, in its 125th week in the following 56 prisons:

Evin Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Ghezel Hesar Prison (Units 2, 3, and 4), Karaj Central Prison, Fardis Prison in Karaj, Greater Tehran Prison, Qarchak Prison, Khorin Prison in Varamin, Choobindar Prison in Qazvin, Ahar Prison, Arak Prison, Langaroud Prison in Qom, Khorramabad Prison, Borujerd Prison, Yasuj Prison, Asadabad Prison in Isfahan, Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz, Sepidar Prison in Ahvaz (women’s and men’s wards), Nezam Prison in Shiraz, Adelabad Prison in Shiraz (women’s and men’s wards), Firouzabad Prison in Fars, Dehdasht Prison, Zahedan Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Borazjan Prison, Ramhormoz Prison, Behbahan Prison, Bam Prison, Yazd Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Kahnuj Prison, Tabas Prison, Birjand Central Prison, Mashhad Prison, Gorgan Prison, Sabzevar Prison, Gonbad-e Kavus Prison, Qaemshahr Prison, Rasht Prison (men’s and women’s wards), Rudsar Prison, Haviq Prison in Talesh, Azbaram Prison in Lahijan, Dizel Abad Prison in Kermanshah, Ardabil Prison, Tabriz Prison, Urmia Prison, Salmas Prison, Khoy Prison, Naqadeh Prison, Miandoab Prison, Mahabad Prison, Bukan Prison, Saqqez Prison, Baneh Prison, Marivan Prison, Sanandaj Prison, Kamyaran Prison, and Ilam Prison.

Week 125
Tuesday, June 16, 2026
#No_To_Execution_Tuesdays_Campaign

Social Suppression

Sacrificing Human Rights in Iran at the Altar of Energy Diplomacy
June 17, 2026
https://iran-hrm.com/2026/06/17/sacrificing-human-rights-in-iran-at-the-altar-of-energy-diplomacy/

While the world remains engrossed in the peace accord between Iran and the United States, counting down the moments for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to restore the global flow of oil and energy, the reality of sacrificing human rights remains glaringly obvious in this deal. There is no demand for the cessation of executions, no appeal for the release of political prisoners, and no accountability for the massacres, slaughters, and war crimes that have swallowed over 30,000 lives—predominantly Iran’s youth. Merely reading the headlines of human rights violations in Iran requires immense emotional fortitude, let alone diving into their details; yet, from the “civilized” world, nothing is heard but a deafening silence of inaction.

  1. The Relentless Execution Machine: Sacrificing Human Rights in Seven Days

A- Political executions rights after the announcement of the deal

June 16: On 16 June, Mizan News Agency reported the execution of Javad Zamani and Abolfazl Saedi, two individuals arrested during the nationwide protests of December 2025 in Semnan Province. Although authorities have published a list of securityrelated charges against these political prisoners, no transparent information has been made available regarding the interrogation process, the judicial proceedings, the fairness and quality of the trial, or their access to legal defense rights.

B- Executions related to ordinary crimes just in one week:

  • June 15 :Execution of eleven prisoners across seven prisons in the country.
  • June 14 :Execution of 7 prisoners; one prisoner had been on death row for 26 years. Can you fathom the agony he endured?
  • June 13 :Execution of eleven prisoners across four prisons.
  • June 12 :Execution of three prisoners in the prisons of Bandar Abbas, Mashhad, and Dezful.
  • June 11 :Execution of at least six prisoners in the prisons of Maku, Khoy, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Shirvan.
  • June 10 :Execution of three prisoners in the prisons of Diesel Abad (Kermanshah) and Mahshahr.
  • June 9 :Execution of four prisoners in the prisons of Mashhad, Isfahan, and Meshgin Shahr.

This amounts to 45 prisoners in just one single week; 45 human beings, 45 families.

  1. Suppression of Protesters, Students, and Trade Unions: Judicial Framing and Judicial Limbo
  2. A) Protesters and Detained Citizens
  • Sentence of 6 years in prison and flogging; Mehdi Pak-mehr, an artist from Bojnourd and one of the wounded victims of the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests.
  • Sentence of 2 years in prison for Pedram Cheraghzadeh, one of the detainees of the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests.
  • Sentence of six months in prison for Zahra (Mahsa) Jamali, one of the detainees of the January protests.
  • 110 days of judicial limbo for Morteza Arab-Khorasani in Vakilabad Prison, 14 days of which were spent in absolute incommunicado detention.
  • Sentence of one year in prison for Youssef Ansari, a member of the board of secretaries of the Iranian Writers’ Association, on charges of propaganda against the state.
  • 5 months of complete lack of news regarding the fate of Soroush Karami, an 18-year-old youth from Kermanshah detained during the 2025/2026 protests.
  • Piranshahr; 16 days of arbitrary detention and lack of news regarding the fate of Khaled Hasanzadeh; no information is available about his whereabouts.
  • A raid by security forces on the residences of two brothers, Sardar and Ehsan Rahmani, in Kamyaran on June 13, with no information on their fate following their summons.
  1. B) Teachers and Trade Union Activists
  • Sentence of 15 months in prison for Mehdi Fathi, a teachers’ union activist.
  • Mohammad Ali Zahmatkesh, a teachers’ union activist in Fars Province, has been held in temporary pre-trial detention since April of this year and remains in judicial limbo.
  • The detention order for Siamak Sadeghi Chehrazi, a teachers’ union activist in Khuzestan Province, has been extended for the third consecutive month.
  • Masoud Farhikhteh, a teachers’ union activist—who has been serving his sentence of three years, six months, and one day in the Central Prison of Karaj since September 16, 2025, following the confirmation of his ruling by Branch 12 of the Alborz Province Appeals Court—is now facing a newly fabricated judicial case.
  • Sentence of one year in prison for Iman Shahvandi, a teachers’ union activist; Iman Shahvandi, an educator and teachers’ union activist residing in Pasargad.
  • Continued detention and lack of news on the fate of Kamal Omidi; Kamal Omidi, a 49-year-old citizen, instructor, and director of a language institute in Khomein, since approximately one month ago.
  1. C) Students and the Academic Sphere
  • Ilya Bakhshayi, a sports science student (class of 2022/1401) at the University of Yezd who was arrested during the January protests, has been sentenced to 5 years in prison.
  • Confirmation of a two-year prison sentence for Ali Taherikia, one of the students arrested during the January 2026 protests.
  • Pouria Amini; sentencing the former student of Mashhad University to 5 years in prison following an initial acquittal, raising deep concerns over the intervention of security apparatuses in the judicial process.
  • On Monday, June 1, 2026 (11 Khordad 1405), Abolfazl Chamani, a pure mathematics student at the University of Tehran, was arrested by government forces and transferred to an unknown location; no information on his fate is available to date.
  • Reza Dalman, a master’s student in computer engineering at Sharif University of Technology, was sentenced by the university’s disciplinary committee to expulsion and a four-year ban from studying in all universities across the country for hanging a mouse on a tree trunk during the days of protests.
  • Approximately 22 students at Soore University are facing initial rulings from the disciplinary committee. These rulings include at least four expulsions and a number of temporary academic suspensions.
  • Sajjad University of Mashhad; 10 students have been hit with academic suspension rulings.
  1. D) Detained Women
  • Female Detainees of the 2025/2026 Protests in Langaroud Prison, Qom:Fresh information obtained by the Iran Human Rights Monitor from Langaroud Prison in Qom has heightened grave concerns regarding the status of women detained during the nationwide 2025/2026 protests. According to these reports, hundreds of women are being held in the women’s ward of this prison, and some sources estimate their numbers to be significantly higher than officially reported data. It is stated that a notable portion of these prisoners consists of young girls and even minors who remain held in indefinite judicial limbo.

And this list could be extended for pages.

  1. Structural Pressure on Religious Minorities
    • Continued judicial limbo for Mahsa and Mandana Sotoudeh, Baha’i sisters detained in Adelabad Prison, Shiraz, for over 70 days.
    • Pezhman Zare; continued judicial limbo for the Baha’i citizen in Adelabad Prison, Shiraz, despite bail being secured.
    • Arrest of Ahmed Naeimi, a Baha’i citizen in Yazd.

To these cases, one could add the conditions of prisons, tortures, the list of individuals currently on death row, the list of political prisoners executed since the outbreak of the war, and dozens of other lists; yet one question remains.

Why is Domestic Crackdown in Iran Ignored?
Why did the world exert such immense effort to ensure the Strait of Hormuz remains open, yet we see not a shred of effort or practical action to halt the countless human rights violations in Iran? Has the defense of global human rights deteriorated into a mere public relations veneer?

Decoupling economic interest from human principles in this accord sends a hazardous signal to the regime’s repressive apparatus: that as long as the flow of energy is maintained, sacrificing human rights and playing with the lives and fates of protesters, teachers, students, and minorities hold no currency in diplomatic transactions. This inaction is not merely silence in the face of injustice; it is a form of tacit legitimation granted to the survival of a structure that holds the fundamental rights of its citizens captive. It is time for the international community to recognize that true regional stability can never be achieved by turning a blind eye to the machinery of repression.

How the Islamic Republic in Iran Recruits and Trains Repressive Forces
June 16, 2026
https://iran-hrm.com/2026/06/16/how-the-islamic-republic-in-iran-recruits-and-trains-repressive-forces/

Chapter One: Explaining the Ideological Educational System and the Roots of the Project
Every political system or ideological school of thought designs a specific educational system to preserve its values. However, what distinguishes the educational philosophy of the Islamic Republic in Iran from conventional models is the purposeful process of nurturing individuals who, as the ideological and executive arms of the regime, take on the responsibility of ideological infiltration into society, confronting critics, and participating directly in the apparatus of domestic repression.

Prior to this, the process of political socialization and the brainwashing of children in schools had been addressed—a process that injects intellectual loyalty to the regime from an early age. In this special report, we turn to another of the regime’s most key and cohesive cadre-building units, whose primary task is the attraction, screening, and ultimate recruitment of field forces for the Basij and the ideological layers of the ruling establishment: the “Basij Salehin Program” or “Salehin Educational Network.”

History, Formation, and Contexts of Development

  • Within the Islamic Republic, this network is introduced in the official literature of the Basij as an educational, doctrinal, and organizational system, the operational core of which is the “Salehin Circle”(Halqe-ye Salehin). The initial roots of this circle-based model trace back to prior experiences of mosque-based cadre-building, particularly in Khuzestan province. According to the official structure, the primary designer and founder of the Basij Salehin circles process is Hojjat-al-Islam Saeed Dasmi, who initially established this model in the mosques of Ahvaz and Khuzestan province, and it was subsequently extended across the entire country. Nevertheless, an analysis of its evolution reveals that the nationwide expansion of this project was a structural response to crises of political legitimacy:
  • Late 2000s (Post-Crisis Formulation):The planning and ideological formulation of this program dates back to 2009 (1388 AP). Following the events of the tenth presidential election, the regime expanded this model with the aim of reorganizing the intellectual training system of Basij members and controlling doctrinal vacuums.
  • Early 2010s (Consolidation and National Expansion):The launch of the nationwide implementation of this program was triggered around 2011 (1390 AP), and since then, it has been consolidated and expanded as a capillary network at the national level.

Chapter Two: Anatomy of the Structure, Elements, and Organizational Pyramid of the Circles

Definition, Dimensions, and Characteristics of the “Salehin Circle”

On the surface, a Salehin Circle (Halqe-ye Salehin) is a cultural-educational gathering of 5 to 15 individuals of similar age or level (adolescents, youth, and adults) formed within contexts such as mosques, Basij resistance bases, schools, universities, or other echelons of the Basij. Ostensibly, these circles are established to foster the spiritual, behavioral, and intellectual growth of their members, carrying stated functions such as identity-building, skill acquisition, discourse-shaping, and cadre-building.

Core Operational and Executive Characteristics of the Circles:

  • Small and Regular Groups:Sessions are conducted in limited gatherings to facilitate easier intellectual control and monitoring.
  • Dialogue-Centric and Experience-Based:Unlike traditional classrooms, these circles are grounded in Q&A and guided discussion management, ensuring members do not feel subordinated and can adopt the ideas more easily.
  • Focus on Moral and Behavioral Guidance:Efforts are directed toward placing the lifestyle and behavioral frameworks of the members under strict supervision.

Principal Characteristics of the Circle’s Mentor (Morabbi) or Leader (Sar-goruah)

In official descriptions, the mentor or group leader is recognized as the foundational pillar for content and organizational guidance. Mentors within this program typically share the following common traits:

  1. Serving as a Behavioral Role Model:Above all, the mentor must personally embody the regime-approved ethics, discipline, religiosity, and conduct to project a charismatic persona.
  2. High Interpersonal Communication Skills:Establishing an intimate, secure, and trusting relationship with adolescents and youth to infiltrate deeply into their psychological layers.
  3. Dialogue Facilitation Skills:Proficiency in discussion management and running sessions in a workshop-style format, rather than delivering one-way lectures.
  4. Familiarity with Religious and Ethical Foundations:Mastery sufficient to address doubts and provide simple, accessible, and ideologically directed answers to members’ questions.
  5. Problem-Solving and Basic Counseling Skills:Intervening in the academic, family, or social matters of the members to transform the circle into the individual’s primary refuge and reference point.
  6. Commitment and Continuity:Sustained and responsible presence, given that these circles cannot materialize through sporadic attendance and demand a continuous relationship.

Where is a Salehin Circle Mentor Trained?

The pipeline for supplying and developing mentors typically passes through four primary channels:

  • The Basij Organization’s Educational Courses:Mentors receive training through official programs, including group leadership courses, educational mentorship courses, communication skills workshops, and doctrinal/ethical seminars.
  • Mosques and Cultural Bases:Gaining practical experience by participating in local mosques and religious congregations (Heiyats).
  • The Master-Apprentice System (Senior Mentors and Instructors):Novice mentors operate under the supervision of a senior mentor for a period to acquire practical field experience.
  • Guided Independent Study:Personal development through approved books on ethics, religious psychology, and mandated theological topics.

Organizational Pyramid and Session Structure

This educational system is managed through a multi-layered, hierarchical network structured as follows:

  1. Mentor (Morabbi/ Senior Mentor): Responsible for training the group leaders (Sar-goruahs), designing educational programs, and supervising the quality of the circles.
  2. Group Leader (Sar-goruah/ Circle Facilitator): Conductor of the sessions, maintaining close contact and pursuing the weekly educational and behavioral tracking of the members.
  3. Circle Members (Motarabbian / Trainees):Gatherings of 5 to 15 individuals who participate in dialogues, educational assignments, and collective activities.

Standard Process of a One-Hour Session:

  • Opening and Ice-breaking (5–10 minutes):Building rapport and assessing the psychological status and weekly well-being of the members.
  • Recitation or Inspiring Text (5 minutes):Reading a verse, Hadith, or a short ethical excerpt to cultivate a spiritual atmosphere.
  • Main Discussion (30–45 minutes):Dialogue and guided Q&A regarding the designated topic of the session.
  • Conclusion and Educational Assignment (5–10 minutes):Assigning a moral, behavioral exercise or a short reading for the following week.

Intellectual Sources and Teaching References in the Circles [Footnote 1]

The content injected into these circles is filtered through specific books compiled directly by the Basij Education and Training Deputy, or selected from traditional texts:

  • Guidance booklets for the “Salehin Educational Program” and the “Salehin Mentor” (Basij Organization).
  • Jurisprudential and ethical books: “Forty Hadiths” by Ruhollah Khomeini, and “Jihad al-Nafs (The internal spiritual and moral struggle against base desires, often referred to in Islamic theology as the ‘Greater Jihad’)” (Excerpts from Bihar al-Anwar).

Note to the reader: “Bihar al-Anwar” (Oceans of Lights) is a comprehensive compendium of Shia Hadiths (traditions and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and the Shia Imams). Compiled by the prominent Safavid-era scholar Mullah Mohammad-Baqir Majlesi (known as Allameh Majlesi) in the late 17th century, it is one of the largest and most influential narrative collections in Shia Islam, covering Islamic theology, history, ethics, and jurisprudence.

  • Ideological exposition books: “The General Outline of Islamic Thought in the Qur’an” (Ali Khamenei) and “The Way of Life (Applied Ethics)”.

Note to the reader 1: The book “The General Outline of Islamic Thought in the Qur’an” is a compilation of lectures delivered by Ali Khamenei in 1974 (1353 AP) prior to the revolution. In recent years, it has been designated as one of the primary instructional texts and resources in the Basij Salehin circles, Velayat courses, and the regime’s cadre-building processes, making it mandatory for ideological-political forces to re-read and debate its contents.

Note to the reader 2: Aeen-e Zendegi (The Way of Life: Applied Ethics)” is a widely circulated textbook authored by Islamic scholar Ahmad Hossein Sharifi and used in Iran’s university-level courses on Islamic ethics. While the book presents itself as a synthesis of classical Islamic moral philosophy and practical guidance for contemporary life, its structure and content closely reflect the normative expectations of the Islamic Republic’s official moral doctrine. It organizes ethical obligations into five domains—academic conduct, professional and economic behavior, social relations, family life, and civic-political participation—each framed within state-sanctioned interpretations of Islamic virtue ethics. In practice, the textbook functions not only as a guide to personal morality but also as an instrument of ideological socialization, promoting forms of civic behavior and political engagement that align with the values and loyalty expectations of the ruling establishment. This dual role situates the book at the intersection of moral instruction and state-driven ethical governance.

  • Official Basij websites, including the official information portal of the Salehin Program and the Basij Education and Training Deputy.

Footnote 1: Official Basij websites, including the Salehin Program Information Portal and the Basij Education and Training Deputy.

Chapter Three: The Process of Legitimizing Repression and the Teaching of “Political Insight” (Basirat) in the Islamic Republic

Is There Official Training for Repression Within the Salehin Circles? [Footnote 2- Details and technics]

The precise academic and documentary answer to this question is negative. In no official document, regulation, or approved educational curriculum within the Salehin circles does there exist operational and security training such as “confronting protesters,” “crowd control,” “detention techniques,” or “combat tactics.” This hardware-based training is provided within separate security and military structures, while the official nature of the circles themselves remains educational, ethical, and cultural.

However, the key reality lies within the functional mechanism of these circles:

Rather than “skills of repression,” the Salehin circles produce the “mentality and worldview that legitimizes repression.” By transmitting the ruling establishment’s intellectual framework, this system constructs a cognitive foundation through which the individual accepts violence or confrontation with dissidents as a moral virtue and a religious duty.

Anatomy of the Five Layers of Teaching “Political Insight” (Basirat) [Footnote 3]

Political insight within these circles is not an academic classroom lecture, but rather an educational-ideological package applied across 5 primary layers:

  1. Mental Framing:

The mentor provides members with a psychological lens through which the world is divided into two absolute fronts: “Truth” (Haqq—represented by the Islamic Republic) and “Falsehood” (Batil—encompassing virtually the rest of the world). Under this framework, any domestic protest or crisis is deemed not a civil demand, but a new phase of the enemy’s “Soft War,” positioning the Supreme Leader as the sole axis for distinguishing truth from falsehood.

  1. Narrative Building:

Contemporary history is taught in a selective and heavily biased manner. Events such as July 1999 (18 Tir 1378 – the student sedition), 2009 (1388 – the American sedition), 2017 and 2019 (1396 and 1398 – organized riots), 2022 (1401 – the Western regime-change project), and 2025 (1404 – the failed coup) are narrated in order to institutionalize a permanent sense of threat and the sacred nature of “defending the establishment” in the mind of the trainee.

  1. Guided Media Literacy:

By screening clips or broadcasting foreign media reports, the mentor instructs members that these tools exist solely for “psychological warfare and fabricating lies.” The result of this method is the total erosion of trust in independent media and the monopolization of information authority within the words of the Supreme Leader and domestic state media.

  1. Role Modeling:

Military figures, war casualties, and senior IRGC commanders are introduced as supreme role models with attributes such as “insightful” (Basir), “brave,” and “loyal to the guardianship” (Velayat-madar), aligning the individual’s identity with these symbols.

  1. Moral Polarization:

Politics is extracted from the sphere of rational critique and transferred into the realm of faith. Consequently, “supporting the regime and obeying the Supreme Leader” is defined as a religious and moral duty and a sign of faith, while “criticism and protest” are characterized as a lack of insight (Bi-basirati) and sedition.

Chapter Four: Security Sociology in the Islamic Republic and the Link Between the Circles and the Recruitment Structure

Why Do Certain Individuals Transition from Within the Salehin Circles into Repressive Roles?

Three indirect yet structural factors enable individuals nurtured within these circles to easily assume stringent and security-oriented roles:

  • Ideological Identity-Building:When an individual deeply believes that the regime is sacred, that the enemy is omnipresent, and that confronting protesters is a “moral duty and a defense of values,” they become psychologically prepared to accept violent roles.
  • Organizational Networking:The circles serve as the primary entry point into the broader structure of the Basij. Within this environment, individuals are channeled into higher echelons (Active Basij, Special Basij, security units, intelligence agencies, and rapid response units). The Salehin Circle is the environment for identifying and vetting, recruitment, and connecting this human chain.
  • Creating an “Ideological Family” Sentiment:Being placed within an intimate network fulfills the individual’s need for social belonging; consequently, to maintain the approval of their mentors and peers, they more readily accept harsher operational roles.

Psychological Typology of Individuals Recruited into Security Roles

Based on research in security sociology, there are five major personality types drawn to these structures, and the Salehin circles handle precisely the initial screening and nurturing of them:

  1. Individuals with a Strong Ideological Identity:Those who view the world through a binary lens (Us/The Enemy) and possess an intense sense of religious obligation.
  2. Individuals with a Need for Structure and Order:Personalities seeking distinct frameworks, who are obedient, thrive under hierarchies, and feel insecure in unstructured environments.
  3. Individuals with Socio-Economic Motivations:Those seeking job security, a fixed salary, organizational benefits, and rapid promotion.
  4. Individuals with Need for Power or Influence:Psychological types who derive a sense of meaning from exercising authority and being involved in key decisions.
  5. Individuals with Personal Experience of Threat or Violence:Those who, due to family or environmental backgrounds, do not fear violence and are willing to perform the role of a “stringent protector.”

Chapter Five: Statistical Distribution, Geographical Spread of the Salehin Circles in the Islamic Republic, and Final Conclusion

The Scope of the Circles’ Activities (Statistics and Structure)

The Salehin circles represent one of the most extensive educational-ideological networks in the Islamic Republic in Iran. Operating as a subsidiary of the Basij Organization, they are active across three primary sectors: neighborhoods, schools (students), and universities. Aggregated and official statistics from the Organization of the Basij of the Oppressed and the High Headquarters of the Shajareh-ye Tayyibah-ye Salehin reveal:

According to the regime’s latest official reports, the number of active circles across the entire country has stabilized between 200,000 and 250,000 circles. This total encompasses adolescent, youth, adult, and specialized circles.

Macro Aggregated and Harmonized National Statistical Table
To resolve contradictions arising from varying publication years across provincial sources, the macro and authoritative indicators of this educational network are classified as follows:

No. Statistical Indicator Documented Quantity / Scale Official Ruling Regime Source / Reference
1 Total Active Salehin Circles Nationwide 200,000 to 250,000 circles High Headquarters of the Shajareh-ye Tayyibah-ye Salehin / Organization of the Basij of the Oppressed
2 Total Number of Organized Members Approximately 3.5 to 4 million individuals Basij Education and Training Deputy (including active and semi-active members)
3 Province of Origin and Historical Pilot Khuzestan Province (Metropolitan Ahvaz) Historical-archival documents of the Salehin project within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
4 Provinces with the Highest Density of Circles Greater Tehran, Razavi Khorasan, Isfahan Statistical reports communicated by the “Basij Resistance Sectors” to provincial IRGC commands
5 Targeted Macro Capacity Training 8 to 10 million youth loyal to the guardianship (Velayati) High-level strategic documents of the project (derived from the statements and demands of Ali Khamenei)

 

Final Conclusion
The “Basij Salehin Program” is not a marginal or traditional program; rather, it is part of a continuous, multi-layered, and engineered structure within the Islamic Republic in Iran designed for the reproduction of political loyalty and ideological cadre-building. By operating actively within the most capillary layers of society (from major metropolitan areas to remote villages, schools, universities, mosques, and neighborhoods), these circles perform a vital function in screening and nurturing forces that defend the ruling establishment.

Analysis of this structure demonstrates that the establishment in Iran, relying on these cohesive educational models, has created a sustainable framework for reproducing its ideology. This process not only suppresses freedom of thought, belief, and human rights within Iran’s borders, but also serves as a hazardous structural template for promoting fundamentalism and extremist methodologies internationally. This institutional sustainability poses a fundamental, long-term challenge to both domestic democratic transformation and regional stability; this reality underscores that any international strategy to counter this challenge must move beyond purely political-military approaches and focus on neutralizing the digital platforms, financial resources, and intellectual conduits of this ideological recruitment machine by actively supporting pluralistic and intellectual alternatives.

Footnote 1: Links and References
The following official URLs and reference links correspond to the ideological sources, teaching materials, and institutional bodies of the Salehin Network cited throughout this report:

Official Institutional Portals

Ethical, Doctrinal, and Training Manuals

Footnote 2: Details and Techincs

Within the Salehin circles, there is no official or structured training aimed at justifying repression, violence, or security-related confrontations. According to official documents, the nature of these sessions is educational-ethical-cultural, rather than security-oriented or operational.

However…

The critical reality is that any ideological institution, whether in Iran or any other country, typically transmits its own worldview. Therefore, within the Salehin circles:

  • The official perspective of the Islamic Republic
  • A specific narrative of the revolution
  • The concept of “submissiveness to the guardianship” (Velayat-paziri)
  • The concept of “defending the regime”
  • And “revolutionary identity”

are raised as part of identity-based upbringing.

While these do not constitute direct training for repression, they can construct a mental framework in which:

  • “Preserving the establishment of the Islamic Republic” is viewed as a paramount value
  • “Obeying the Supreme Leader” is considered a virtue
  • “Confronting the enemy” is presented as a moral duty

In certain individuals, these types of frameworks may lead to the acceptance of more stringent roles within the structure of the Basij or security forces. To be more precise: What elements are raised within the circles that can create the cognitive groundwork for an individual to transform into an agent of repression?

The following are typically observed within the circles:

  • “Adherence to the guardianship” (Velayat-madari)
  • “Defending the revolution”
  • “Combating the soft war”
  • “Enemy recognition” (Doshman-shenasi)
  • “Political insight” (Basirat)
  • “Preserving the values of the regime”

Why do some individuals transform from within the Salehin circles into more stringent or repressive roles? What role do the Salehin circles play in shaping the “mentality”?

1) The Salehin circles do not provide practical training for repression
In no official document, educational curriculum, or structure of the Salehin circle does there exist training such as:

  • Confronting protesters
  • Crowd control
  • Security operations
  • Combat tactics
  • Detention methods

These are taught within separate security/military structures, not within educational circles.

2) However, the Salehin circles transmit a specific worldview
This section is critical. Within the circles, the following concepts are typically raised:

  • “Preserving the regime is the most binding of all duties” (Ojab-e Vajibat)
  • “Submissiveness to the guardianship” (Velayat-paziri)
  • “Enemy recognition” (Doshman-shenasi)
  • “Soft war” (Jang-e Narm)
  • “Political insight” (Basirat)
  • “Defending the revolution”
  • “Revolutionary identity”

These do not constitute training for repression, but they build a mental framework in which:

  • The political system is presented as sacred and beyond critique
  • Political dissent is viewed as a threat
  • Protests may be interpreted as “sedition” (Fitnah) or the enemy’s “soft war”
  • Obeying the Supreme Leader is presented as a moral virtue

This worldview can create the cognitive groundwork for accepting more stringent roles. Therefore, the Salehin circles shape the “mentality,” not the “skills of repression”

In other words, what the circles actively perform consists of:

  • Identity-building
  • Ideology-shaping
  • Ethical-political upbringing
  • Strengthening loyalty to the regime
  • Creating a sense of duty to defend the government

Why do certain individuals enter repressive roles from within these circles? It is due to three indirect factors:

1) Ideological Identity-Building
When an individual believes that:

  • The regime is sacred
  • The enemy is everywhere
  • Protest is a threat
  • Obedience is a religious duty

They develop psychological readiness for harsher roles.

2) Organizational Networking
The circles are typically the primary entry point into the structure of the Basij. From here, individuals are channeled into:

  • Active Basij
  • Special Basij
  • Security units
  • Intelligence agencies

3) Selection of Individuals with a Revolutionary Disposition

The circles help identify “suitable” individuals.

Conclusion:

  • The Salehin circles do not provide training for repression.
  • However, they transmit a worldview that can make repression appear legitimate to certain individuals.
  • And it is this very worldview that channels individuals into security structures.

This section explains how the three afore-mentioned structural factors within the Islamic Republic’s framework enable certain individuals to transition from the Salehin circles into repressive roles, without the circles themselves explicitly or practically providing training for repression.

Ideological Identity-Building
This represents the most critical component. While the Salehin circles are officially categorized as “educational-ethical,” in practice, they forge a robust political-ideological identity. This identity typically instills the following doctrines:

  • “Preserving the regime is the most binding of all duties” (Ojab-e Vajibat)
  • “Obeying the Supreme Leader is a religious obligation”
  • “Protester = Deceived by the enemy”
  • “The West and foreign media are the enemy”
  • “The revolution is under a permanent state of threat”
  • “Jihad is not confined to warfare; defending the regime is also Jihad”

While these doctrines do not constitute direct training for repression, they construct a cognitive lens through which:

  • The government is viewed as sacred and immune to rational critique
  • Political protest is interpreted as an existential threat
  • Confronting a protester is presented as a “moral duty”
  • State-sponsored violence is construed as the “defense of values”

Consequently, individuals within these circles develop the psychological readiness and mental alignment required to assume harsher operational roles.

Organizational Networking
The Salehin circles are not merely instructional classes; they function as the baseline gateway into the broader structure of the Basij. In practice, the circles perform three systematic tasks:

  1. A) Identifying “Suitable” Individuals:

Group leaders and mentors routinely identify trainees who demonstrate specific behavioral traits:

  • Obedience and compliance
  • Strong ideological motivation
  • Active engagement in collective activities
  • Evident political loyalty

These specific individuals are subsequently recommended for elevated roles within the hierarchy.

  1. B) Connection to Higher Echelons:

From these circles, selected individuals are systematically channeled toward the following institutional pathways:

  • Active Basij (Basij-e Fa’al)
  • Special Basij (Basij-e Vije)
  • Security Battalions (Gordan-ha-ye Amniyati)
  • Intelligence Apparatuses
  • Rapid Response Units (Yegan-ha-ye Vakonesh-e Sari)

Although this formal transfer is not part of the explicit curriculum taught within the circles, the circles themselves serve as the primary environment for identification, vetting, and absorption.

  1. C) Cultivating an “Ideological Family” Sentiment:

When an individual is integrated into an intimate, ideologically cohesive network, their propensity to accept harsher assignments escalates because:

  • They experience a deep sense of social belonging
  • They seek to avoid alienation or detachment from the group
  • They possess an intrinsic desire to be “useful”
  • They actively pursue the validation and approval of their mentors and peers

This dynamic constitutes the core mechanism of organizational networking.

Selection of Individuals with a Revolutionary Disposition
This component is fundamentally pivotal. Within the Salehin circles, mentors actively monitor and screen for specific indicators among the participants:

  • Unwavering loyalty to the ruling system
  • Pronounced interest in political-ideological activities
  • Readiness for “self-sacrifice”
  • Absolute acceptance of the state’s official narrative regarding the enemy
  • High motivation for field and operational activities
  • Submissiveness and obedience to hierarchy

Once such an individual is identified through this screening process:

  • They are referred to advanced, higher-level training courses
  • They are invited to participate in Active Basij operations
  • They undergo strict vetting within security-intelligence programs
  • And, if deemed compatible, they are fully integrated into harsher operational structures

Thus, the circles function as the foundational site for the initial identification and incubation of these assets.

Summary:
The Salehin Circles:

  • Do not provide tactical training for repression.
  • Construct a worldview that renders repression “legitimate” and morally justifiable to certain individuals.
  • Build the human network that connects civilian participants to specialized security structures.
  • Identify individuals possessing a revolutionary disposition and systematically guide them toward harsher operational pathways.

Context of Formation
This section addresses why this specific educational model (such as the Salehin circles) was developed within the Islamic Republic in Iran. This educational model is the product of a combination of several historical, political, and social factors. When these factors are synthesized, it becomes entirely clear why such a structure was established:

1) The Experience of the 1979 Revolution and the Need to “Preserve Achievements”
Following the revolution, the new ruling establishment perceived that:

  • The revolution was fragile.
  • Domestic and foreign enemies were numerous.
  • The younger generation had to remain “revolutionary.”

Consequently, an educational model was required to systematically reproduce political loyalty.

2) The Experience of the Iran–Iraq War
The 8-year war resulted in the following dynamics:

  • “Jihad,” “self-sacrifice” (Isar), and “defense” became pivotal core values.
  • The Basij was consolidated as a popular, mobilized force.
  • The government concluded that subsequent generations must also possess this “defensive disposition.”

This historical experience formed the ideological bedrock of the circles.

3) Anxiety Regarding the “Soft War” and Cultural Collapse
From the 2000s (1380s AP) onward, the Iranian government became intensely anxious about:

  • The Internet
  • Satellite television
  • Foreign media
  • The Western lifestyle

The Salehin circles were designed as a direct structural response to this anxiety—an educational system built to control the narrative and shape the identity of the younger generation.

4) The Need for Organizational Networking
For their survival, ruling systems inherently require:

  • Loyal forces
  • Socio-political networks
  • Popular mobilization structures (such as the Basij)

The Salehin circles perform precisely this function: constructing a network of like-minded, loyal, and highly organized individuals.

Footnote 3: Mechanism and Operation
Conclusion: How Does “Political Insight” (Basirat) Operate?

Political insight within the Salehin circles:

  • Is not political analysis
  • Is not the teaching of political science
  • Is not security or tactical training

Rather, it is:

  • A political-religious identity-building system
  • That divides the world into two absolute fronts
  • And defines the individual’s role as “defending the establishment”
  • And interprets every political event within the framework of a “Soft War”

This model causes certain individuals to:

  • View protest as an existential threat
  • Consider confronting protesters as a moral and religious duty
  • Regard security-oriented roles as a “sacred service”

The circles themselves do not provide practical training for repression; they solely construct the necessary cognitive mindset.

Justice System

Iran: Independent Lawyers Under Pressure – Part Two
From Article 48 to the Engineering of the Right to Defense
June 14, 2026
https://iran-hrm.com/2026/06/14/iran-independent-lawyers-under-pressure-part-two/

In the first part of this report, the cases of dozens of lawyers who were arrested, summoned, prosecuted, or deprived of their professional rights were examined. These cases demonstrated that pressure on Iran’s legal community has evolved beyond isolated incidents and has become a nationwide pattern.

Yet a fundamental question remains: What connects these seemingly disparate cases? Are they merely a collection of separate security-related actions, or do they form part of a broader mechanism designed to control the right to defense in political and security-related cases?

This second part examines the role of Article 48 of Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure, restrictions on the right to choose legal counsel, and what many legal experts have described as the “engineering of the right to defense.”

Chapter Three: Engineering the Right to Defense in Iran

A review of cases involving Iranian lawyers in recent years demonstrates that their arrests, summonses, and professional sanctions cannot be understood simply as a series of unrelated incidents. What has emerged across cities including Mashhad, Rasht, Shiraz, Tehran, Tabriz, and Ahvaz points to the development of a broader mechanism aimed at controlling legal defense in political and security-related cases.

Mai Sato, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, has repeatedly warned in her reports and communications about increasing pressure on independent lawyers and the denial of detainees’ access to counsel of their own choosing. She has emphasized that lawyers who sought to defend protesters or document violations of their rights have faced summonses, arrests, threats, and judicial prosecution.

These concerns extend beyond the situation of a handful of lawyers. What has taken shape in Iran is a multi-layered mechanism for controlling the right to defense; one in which the arrest of lawyers, professional restrictions, Article 48, interference in the independence of the Bar Association, and limitations on access to case files all function as components of a single policy.

In an independent judicial system, lawyers play a vital role in maintaining a balance between state power and the rights of the accused. In many political and security-related cases in Iran, however, independent lawyers are viewed as obstacles to the security apparatus because they can document allegations of torture, challenge coerced confessions, record procedural violations during interrogations, and subject judicial proceedings to public scrutiny.

For this reason, pressure on lawyers cannot be analyzed separately from pressure on defendants. As the political climate becomes increasingly securitized and the number of detainees grows, efforts to control the defense process intensify as well. The objective is not merely to punish a number of lawyers; it is to limit society’s capacity to access independent legal representation.

This trend is reflected most clearly in Article 48 of Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure; a provision that has become one of the principal tools for restricting political and security-related defendants’ access to independent lawyers in recent years.

3.1. Article 48: Legalizing Restrictions on the Right to Defense

In many political and security-related cases, the denial of independent legal representation begins not in detention centers or courtrooms but within the legal structure of the case itself. The primary instrument enabling this process is Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Under this provision, individuals accused of offenses related to national security or certain other specified crimes may, during the preliminary investigation stage, choose legal counsel only from a list approved by the Head of the Judiciary. In practice, this restriction constitutes one of the most significant exceptions to the right to freely choose legal representation within Iran’s legal system.

Over the past several years, Article 48 has become one of the most controversial legal provisions in Iran. Critics argue that it has effectively created two separate systems of defense: one for ordinary criminal cases and another for political and security-related cases. As a result, defendants are deprived of the right to freely choose their lawyer precisely in those cases where independent legal representation is most essential.

The significance of this issue became even more pronounced following the nationwide protests of 2025. As the number of detainees increased and large numbers of security-related cases were opened, access to legal counsel emerged as one of the central areas of concern. During this period, numerous reports documented the denial of access to lawyers of choice, delays in lawyer-client meetings, and restrictions on lawyers’ access to case files.

The United Nations Fact-Finding Mission also noted in its reports that defendants in security-related cases have access only to lawyers approved by the judiciary during the investigative phase, and that this situation continues to affect judicial proceedings. United Nations Special Rapporteurs have likewise expressed concern regarding the compatibility of Article 48 with international fair trial standards.

The issue, however, extends beyond restrictions on choosing legal counsel. Many independent lawyers and international legal organizations argue that this mechanism has gradually replaced independent defense with controlled defense. In other words, while independent lawyers face arrest, suspension of their licenses, professional exclusion, or security-related pressure, the role of judiciary-approved lawyers in sensitive cases continues to expand.

This parallel development is not coincidental. The arrest of independent lawyers on the one hand and restrictions on the right to choose counsel on the other represent two dimensions of the same policy. The ultimate objective is to reduce the presence of independent legal observers during the most critical stages of political and security-related proceedings.

Under such circumstances, defendants face not only security agencies, investigators, and prosecutors but also restrictions on choosing their own legal representatives from the very beginning of the judicial process. For this reason, many international legal bodies view Article 48 not merely as a legal provision but as part of a broader mechanism for restricting the right to defense in Iran.

3.2. From Independent Lawyers to Article 48 Lawyers: Replacing Independent Defense with Controlled Defense

The arrest of independent lawyers, restrictions on the right to choose counsel, and the implementation of Article 48 may appear to be separate issues. In practice, however, they form components of a single mechanism that increases state control over legal defense in political and security-related cases.

In recent years, dozens of lawyers have faced arrest, imprisonment, suspension of their licenses, professional bans, or other restrictions because they represented political prisoners, protesters, journalists, women’s rights activists, labor activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and justice-seeking families. At the same time, defendants in security-related cases have encountered growing restrictions on their ability to choose legal counsel.

As the number of independent lawyers active in political cases declines, defendants become increasingly dependent on the limited pool of lawyers approved by the judiciary. In this way, the repression of independent lawyers and restrictions on the choice of counsel reinforce one another.

One of the principal instruments of this process is the system commonly known as “Article 48 lawyers.” Under this framework, defendants in security-related cases may select legal counsel during the investigative stage only from a list approved by the judiciary. Consequently, the right to freely choose a lawyer, a fundamental component of a fair trial, is restricted in the most sensitive categories of cases.

Critics have warned for years that this mechanism was designed not to safeguard the right to defense but to control it. When defendants lose the ability to choose an independent and trusted lawyer, the balance between the citizen and the security apparatus is fundamentally altered.

These criticisms have not come solely from human rights advocates. Some lawyers themselves have publicly criticized the conduct of Article 48 lawyers. In one instance, a lawyer wrote in reference to the conduct of an Article 48 lawyer: “You accepted the disgrace of being an Article 48 lawyer; at the very least, be honorable enough not to lie.”

Critics further argue that some Article 48 lawyers, because of structural ties to judicial and security institutions, lack the professional independence necessary to effectively represent political defendants. According to these critics, in certain cases the role of such lawyers has resembled the legitimization of judicial proceedings more than the effective defense of defendants’ rights.

Concerns regarding this mechanism intensified following the nationwide protests of 2025. Multiple reports indicate that, in some cases, even Article 48 lawyers were denied full access to case files and supporting documentation. In Mashhad, some of these lawyers encountered restrictions on accepting representation and accessing case materials. Similar reports emerged from Tehran concerning limitations on access to evidence.

These developments demonstrate that the issue extends beyond restrictions on the choice of counsel. In certain political and security-related cases, limitations have expanded from the selection of lawyers to the defense process itself.

Accordingly, the arrest of independent lawyers, Article 48, and restrictions on access to case files should not be viewed as separate issues. Together, they form a mechanism whose ultimate effect is the restriction of independent legal defense in political and security-related cases.

It is at this point that the concept of the “engineering of the right to defense” acquires practical meaning. Under this model, defense is not eliminated; it is controlled. The appearance of judicial process is maintained, while the capacity for independent legal representation is gradually constrained and managed. As a result, defendants may formally have access to legal counsel while being deprived, in practice, of genuinely independent and effective representation.

The mechanism for restricting the right to defense, however, does not end with Article 48 or limitations on the choice of counsel. In recent years, increasing pressure on the Bar Association and heightened restrictions in cases related to the nationwide protests of 2025 have demonstrated that this process has expanded further. The third part of this report examines the role of the Bar Association, protest-related prosecutions, and the responses of international legal and human rights organizations.

Iran: Independent Lawyers Under Pressure – Part 3
From the 2025 Nationwide Protests to the Erosion of the Right to Defense
June 16, 2026
https://iran-hrm.com/2026/06/16/iran-independent-lawyers-under-pressure-part-3/

In the first part of this report, the pattern of repression targeting independent lawyers and the most significant cases involving prosecuted attorneys were examined. The second part analyzed the role of Article 48 and other mechanisms used to restrict the right to defense.

The consequences of these policies became most visible in cases related to the nationwide protests of 2025. As the number of detainees increased, restrictions imposed on lawyers intensified. The exclusion of independent lawyers from security-related cases, limitations on access to clients and case files, pressure on the Bar Association, and growing international concern collectively provided a clear picture of how the mechanism for controlling legal defense operates in Iran.

This third part examines that critical stage; the point at which the “engineering of the right to defense” moved beyond a legal and institutional framework and revealed its practical consequences in the cases of thousands of detainees.

Chapter Four: The Bar Association; From an Independent Institution to the Last Bastion of Legal Independence

Alongside the arrest and prosecution of independent lawyers, one of the most significant dimensions of pressure on Iran’s legal community has been the gradual erosion of the independence of Bar Associations. This process has not targeted only individual lawyers or isolated cases; it has increasingly affected the institutional foundations of the legal profession itself.

Under the 1954 Law on the Independence of the Bar Association, Bar Associations are recognized as independent institutions, and lawyers are expected to carry out their professional duties free from government interference. In recent years, however, a series of legal, administrative, and security-related measures has significantly restricted that independence.

Among the most significant developments has been the growing role of the judiciary in overseeing the issuance and renewal of law licenses, as well as the expansion of parallel legal service structures. According to many legal experts, these developments have weakened the independence of the legal profession and increased its dependence on judicial authorities.

Pressure has not been limited to legislation and regulations. In recent years, members of Bar Association boards, prominent lawyers, and professional advocates have also faced summonses, judicial prosecution, and security-related pressure. In some cases, even defending the independence of the Bar Association has been treated as a security issue.

The significance of this trend extends far beyond the legal profession itself. The independence of lawyers and Bar Associations constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial. The more this independence is restricted, the less access citizens have to effective legal representation.

For this reason, many legal scholars view pressure on Bar Associations and pressure on independent lawyers as two dimensions of a single policy; one aimed at limiting the capacity for independent legal defense against security and judicial institutions.

Under these circumstances, the Bar Association has become one of the last independent legal institutions in Iran; an institution whose future is directly linked to citizens’ ability to access independent legal counsel and enjoy fair trial guarantees.

Chapter Five: The 2025 Nationwide Protests; Where the Engineering of the Right to Defense Became Visible

If the arrest of independent lawyers, Article 48, and pressure on the Bar Association can be understood as separate indicators of a broader policy, then the cases arising from the nationwide protests of 2025 represent the point at which all these elements converge and reveal how that policy operates in practice.

The nationwide protests of 2025 were accompanied by a wave of mass arrests. Under such circumstances, the families of detainees needed independent legal representation more than ever. Yet information gathered from cases arising during this period indicates that unprecedented restrictions were imposed on lawyers precisely when demand for legal defense was at its highest.

5.1. Lawyers Who Were Never Allowed to Enter the Case

According to information received from multiple cities, no independent lawyers have thus far been able to formally represent individuals accused in so-called security-related cases connected to the nationwide protests and arrests that followed.

This issue is significant for several reasons.

In many previous political cases, authorities sought to restrict the choice of legal counsel but did not entirely deny the presence of lawyers. In cases linked to the 2025 protests, reports indicate that in numerous instances even the initial entry of independent lawyers into proceedings was prevented.

In other words, the issue extended beyond the selection of counsel; access to independent legal representation itself became obstructed.

Some lawyers reported that when attempting to accept representation or inquire about their clients’ status, they encountered degrading treatment, insults, threats, or pressure from prosecutors’ offices and Revolutionary Courts. In certain cases, lawyers were effectively excluded from proceedings before they could begin providing legal defense.

5.2. The 2025 Protests and Intensified Restrictions on Access to Counsel

The nationwide protests of 2025 not only increased the number of detainees but also intensified existing restrictions on access to legal representation. Reports from protest-related cases indicate that many detainees were denied prompt and effective access to lawyers of their choosing, while judicial proceedings unfolded in an intensely securitized environment.

Independent estimates place the number of individuals detained during the nationwide protests at more than 50,000. At the same time, United Nations experts and human rights mechanisms expressed concern regarding widespread arbitrary arrests, denial of access to legal counsel, prolonged detention in security facilities, and reports of enforced disappearances. They warned that, in many cases, families remained unaware of detainees’ whereabouts and that effective access to lawyers or independent oversight of detention and interrogation procedures was absent.

Under such circumstances, the issue of independent lawyers was not merely a professional or occupational concern. In cases involving tens of thousands of detainees, allegations of torture, forced confessions, arbitrary detention, and possible enforced disappearances, access to independent legal counsel became one of the most important safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights. It was precisely during this period that pressure on lawyers, restrictions on access to case files, and the exclusion of independent counsel from judicial proceedings intensified.

A review of cases from this period demonstrates that restrictions stemming from Article 48, pressure on independent lawyers, and barriers to accessing case files operated simultaneously and reinforced one another. As a result, many families found themselves confronting Revolutionary Courts and security institutions while deprived of meaningful access to independent legal defense.

From a human rights perspective, this situation is particularly significant. Allegations of torture, forced confessions, prolonged detention, and violations of defendants’ rights often arise precisely during periods when access to legal counsel is most critical. Yet available evidence indicates that restrictions on lawyers have intensified at exactly this stage.

For this reason, the repression of lawyers and restrictions on access to counsel cannot be viewed merely as a byproduct of the protests. Rather, they formed part of a broader mechanism that reduced independent oversight of detention, interrogation, and judicial proceedings.

In practice, the protests of 2025 became the point at which all components of the legal-defense control mechanism were simultaneously visible; from the exclusion of independent lawyers and the application of Article 48 to restrictions on case files and the conduct of trials within a security-dominated environment.

Mashhad: Even Article 48 Lawyers Faced Restrictions

One of the most significant findings concerning protest-related cases emerged from Mashhad. According to available information, even some lawyers approved under Article 48 encountered serious obstacles in accessing case files and accepting representation.

This finding is significant because Article 48 was originally designed to restrict defendants’ choice of counsel and replace independent lawyers with a judiciary-approved list. Yet in some protest-related cases, restrictions extended even beyond that framework. If even approved lawyers are unable to effectively participate in proceedings, an important question arises:

What is the true purpose of these restrictions?

Is the issue merely the selection of counsel, or is the presence of any meaningful legal defense in sensitive security-related cases being restricted?

Tehran: A Lawyer Exists, but the Case File Is Not Accessible

Similar information emerged from Tehran. According to available reports, some Article 48 lawyers involved in protest-related cases were denied full access to all documents and evidence contained in case files.

This represents one of the least discussed dimensions of the violation of defense rights in Iran.

Many legal debates focus on the right to choose counsel. Yet access to case files is an inseparable component of effective legal defense. A lawyer who lacks access to the full contents of a file, investigative reports, evidence supporting the charges, and related documentation is effectively deprived of the ability to provide comprehensive representation.

Under such circumstances, the presence of legal counsel risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive.

Trials Conducted in a Security-Dominated Environment

A review of causes related to the nationwide protests of 2025 indicates that many proceedings were conducted in a heavily securitized atmosphere. Families and lawyers reported a lack of transparency, difficulty obtaining information about cases, restrictions on communication with defendants, and uncertainty surrounding judicial procedures.

In such an environment, the right to defense, which should serve as one of the principal guarantees of a fair trial, is gradually weakened. A defendant who cannot freely choose a lawyer, a lawyer who cannot enter the case, and a lawyer who lacks access to the full case file are all components of the same chain.

From the Repression of Protesters to the Repression of Their Defenders

One defining characteristic of the 2025 nationwide protests was that pressure extended beyond detainees themselves. As arrests increased, pressure also intensified against those capable of defending them.

The arrest of independent lawyers, restrictions on access to clients, implementation of Article 48, and limitations on access to case files collectively formed a mechanism that reduced independent oversight of detention, interrogation, and judicial proceedings.

For this reason, the protests of 2025 can be viewed as the most significant test of the right to defense in recent years; a period in which every component of the legal-defense control mechanism, from the exclusion of independent lawyers to restrictions on access to case files, became simultaneously visible.

Chapter Six: Responses from the Legal Community and International Organizations

The repression of independent lawyers in Iran has not gone unnoticed internationally. In recent years, the United Nations, international legal organizations, and professional bar associations have repeatedly expressed concern regarding the arrests, prosecutions, and restrictions imposed on lawyers in Iran.

A common principle underlies these concerns: lawyers should not be prosecuted or punished for carrying out their professional duties, including the representation of political prisoners, protesters, journalists, civil society activists, or justice-seeking families.

This principle is reflected in international standards governing the independence of the legal profession and in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.

6.1. The United Nations: Warning About the Erosion of Defense Rights in Iran

Between 2024 and 2026, various United Nations mechanisms repeatedly expressed concern regarding the situation of independent lawyers and access to legal counsel in Iran.

Mai Sato, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, highlighted increasing restrictions imposed on lawyers, civil society activists, and political detainees. She warned that many detainees are denied effective access to lawyers of their choosing and expressed concern regarding growing pressure on human rights defenders and individuals documenting human rights violations.

The United Nations Fact-Finding Mission also identified recurring patterns of fair-trial violations, including restrictions on access to counsel, reliance on coerced confessions, denial of family contact, and judicial proceedings that fail to meet international standards.

Likewise, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and other human rights mechanisms have repeatedly emphasized that prompt and unhindered access to independent legal counsel is a fundamental component of a fair trial and that depriving defendants of this right may undermine the legitimacy of the entire judicial process.

6.2. The International Legal Community: Defending the Independence of the Legal Profession

In addition to the United Nations, several respected legal and professional organizations have responded to the situation of lawyers in Iran.

The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Lawyers for Lawyers, International Bar Association, and International Commission of Jurists have repeatedly called for an end to the arrest and prosecution of independent lawyers in Iran.

These organizations have emphasized that lawyers should not face prosecution for carrying out their professional responsibilities, including representing political prisoners, protesters, journalists, civil society activists, and justice-seeking families.

A significant portion of these concerns relate to Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the restriction of the right to freely choose legal counsel. In the view of these organizations, both the independence of the legal profession and the right to choose a lawyer are fundamental components of a fair trial, and structural restrictions on these rights undermine the balance between citizens and the judicial system.

6.3. Conflict with International Standards

Pressure on independent lawyers in Iran is not merely a professional issue. It conflicts with a range of international human rights standards, including Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.

Under these standards, lawyers must be able to perform their professional duties without threats, intimidation, pressure, or prosecution. Citizens must also enjoy the right to freely choose legal counsel and to have effective access to legal defense.

The cases examined in this report demonstrate a substantial gap between these international standards and the reality in Iran; a gap that became even more apparent following the nationwide protests of 2025.

Conclusion : From Excluding Lawyers to Controlling Judicial Proceedings

A review of documented cases between 2024 and 2026 demonstrates that pressure on independent lawyers in Iran cannot be understood as a collection of isolated incidents or ad hoc decisions.

The arrest of independent lawyers, security-related prosecutions, suspension or revocation of law licenses, restrictions on access to clients, the application of Article 48, limitations on access to case files, and pressure on Bar Associations all form components of a single pattern.

This pattern became particularly visible after the nationwide protests of 2025. At a time when thousands of individuals faced security-related charges and the need for independent legal defense was greater than ever, restrictions imposed on lawyers and defense rights also intensified.

The findings of this report indicate that the objective of these measures is not merely the punishment of a handful of prominent lawyers. Rather, what has occurred in practice is the restriction of society’s capacity to access independent legal defense and to maintain legal oversight of security and judicial institutions.

For this reason, the repression of independent lawyers should be understood as part of the broader architecture of political repression in Iran; an architecture in which the control of defendants, the control of information, and the control of legal defense are pursued simultaneously.

The cases of Mohammad Najafi, Taher Naghavi, Khosrow Alikordi, Mohammadreza Faghihi, Shima Ghoosheh, and dozens of other lawyers represent only a portion of this broader pattern. Collective cases in Mashhad, Rasht, Shiraz, and Yazd, together with restrictions imposed in protest-related prosecutions demonstrate that the repression of lawyers has evolved beyond the prosecution of individuals and has become a structural policy.

Ultimately, developments in Iran during recent years can be understood as an effort to engineer the right to defense; a process in which independent legal representation is not formally abolished but is progressively restricted, directed, and controlled. The consequences of such a process extend beyond lawyers themselves and affect every citizen who relies on independent legal counsel when confronting the judicial system.