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Consider this: The Iran nuclear negotiations that concluded July 14 with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did not begin in 2013 after the election of so-called moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Rather, they began under the adversarial presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The ayatollah, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, recently acknowledged this as he attempted to encourage Iranians to maintain and extend the country’s combative relationship with the United States. His subordinates have followed suit. Iranian Brigadier Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi famously welcomed the nuclear agreement by saying that Iranians should hate the United States “100 times more” because of it.
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LONDON — According to a draft document seen by the Associated Press, it appears that Iranian technicians — and not the International Atomic Energy Agency — will be taking the lead in collecting samples from the Parchin military complex to check for the presence of any trace amounts of nuclear material. This is the site in Iran whereconventional explosives testing possibly relevant to nuclear weapons research isalleged to have taken place more than a decade ago. Usually, IAEA staff would do the sampling themselves. So — assuming the Associated Press story is true, and the draft document reflects the final agreed measures — how come such a “managed-access” arrangement was granted to Iran this time? It’s hard to be certain, but it may be because the IAEA’s track record under its previous head of safeguards, Olli Heinonen, is marred by the botched analysis of the Syrian site at Al Kibar. The Iranians may be insisting on leading the Parchin inspections themselves to make sure they, too, are not wrongly accused by the IAEA. |
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LONDON — According to a draft document seen by the Associated Press, it appears that Iranian technicians — and not the International Atomic Energy Agency — will be taking the lead in collecting samples from the Parchin military complex to check for the presence of any trace amounts of nuclear material. This is the site in Iran whereconventional explosives testing possibly relevant to nuclear weapons research isalleged to have taken place more than a decade ago. Usually, IAEA staff would do the sampling themselves. So — assuming the Associated Press story is true, and the draft document reflects the final agreed measures — how come such a “managed-access” arrangement was granted to Iran this time? It’s hard to be certain, but it may be because the IAEA’s track record under its previous head of safeguards, Olli Heinonen, is marred by the botched analysis of the Syrian site at Al Kibar. The Iranians may be insisting on leading the Parchin inspections themselves to make sure they, too, are not wrongly accused by the IAEA. |
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Appeasing Iran?
The Hill Alan J. Kuperman
As Congress reviews the Iran nuclear deal, it faces the hardest choice in foreign affairs: whether to threaten or appease an adversary. The proper choice, scholars agree, depends on the rival’s intent.
If the other country is “status quo” – just wants to be left alone to prosper without dominating other countries or flouting international rules – we should concede its limited demands. Appeasement is not a dirty word in such a case, but the ideal foreign policy. However, if the other country is “revisionist” – seeking to dominate others and overturn the global order – we must deter it through coercion including the threat of force.
Such advice may sound simple, but misreading intent can lead to disaster. If we threaten a status quo country, the result can be unnecessary war, such as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The opposite mistake – appeasing a revision state – can be even worse. Conciliating Nazi Germany led to a war so terrible that “appeasement” has forever been transformed into an epithet. Though no two historical moments are identical, the similarities between the pending Iran nuclear deal and the Munich agreement of 1938 are haunting.
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